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International trade in food and agriculture has more than doubled in real terms since 1995 to a 
value of USD 1.5 trillion in 2018. Indonesia benefits from this trade, with food and agricultural 
imports valued at USD 20 billion and exports at USD 37 billion in 2018. Indonesia imports food 
commodities such as wheat, garlic, soybeans, sugar, and beef, and exports commodities that have 
a comparative advantage such as palm oil, coffee, nuts, spices, and processed food products. The 
increased competitiveness of Indonesia’s food, beverages, and tobacco manufacturing industries 
indicates there is a huge potential for Indonesia to compete globally and grow its economy.
Despite the importance of food trade, Indonesia uses non-tariff barriers to trade (Non-tariff 
Measures or NTMs) more extensively in the food and agriculture sector than its peer countries of 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam. NTMs are policies other than tariffs imposed on international 
trade. As of January 2021, there were 466 coded NTMs administered by eight different 
Indonesian ministries and agencies that cover almost all of food and agriculture products. NTMs 
impose additional costs for enforcement, sourcing, and process-adaptation to food and beverage 
(F&B) manufacturing businesses, limit corporate access to the global market, and may reduce 
productivity and competitiveness. NTMs can, therefore, act as costly barriers to trade, even 
having a bigger influence than tariffs. With this, NTMs also undermine food security. Indonesia 
currently ranks only on position 65 out of 113 countries in the Global Food Security Index. 
The Omnibus Law on Job Creation from 2020 revises the 2012 Food Law towards more liberalised 
food trade policy. However, existing Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade regulations 
that contain NTMs on food import remain in force. Technical measures such as sanitary or 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT), and pre-shipment inspection 
(PSI) increase compliance and storage cost due to inefficiencies in the enforcement of the NTM. 
Quantitative restrictions (QR) or quota imposed through non-automatic import licensing system 
are associated with import delays due to the complicated process, resulting in food shortages in 
the market and skyrocketing domestic retail prices. 
Three reforms can minimize the cost of NTMs. First, the Ministry of Trade should lead a 
comprehensive review of existing NTMs. Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) should clarify 
the cost and benefits of specific NTMs, and allow for the removal of those with large net costs. 
Second, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade need to consider improving 
enforcement infrastructure and systems to minimize compliance cost. Last but not least, the 
Ministry of Trade should introduce an automatic import licensing system that replaces the quota 
system to facilitate transparency, predictability, and ease of trade.
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INDONESIA’S FOOD TRADE POLICY REFORM
The passage of Indonesia’s Omnibus Law in late 2020 revised Indonesia’s Food Law towards a 
more liberalised food trade policy. It recognised that food imports and domestic food production 
have equally important roles in achieving food security. The effectiveness of this policy change 
will depend on the implementation of the food trade aspects of the Omnibus Law and how far 
Indonesia can reform its complex food trade policy. To maximise both food security and economic 
gains that Indonesia can achieve, existing barriers to trade must be critically examined and 
reformed.
Non-tariff measures (NTMs)— policy measures other than tariffs that can potentially have an 
economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, prices or both—are 
an increasingly prominent part of global trade regimes. NTMs are given the focus in this article 
for two reasons. First, NTMs are increasingly replacing tariffs as tariffs have been progressively 
liberalised through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/
WTO) and various trade agreements. Second, some NTMs can act as costly barriers to trade for 
both importers and exporters. These NTMs can have a bigger influence than tariffs on inhibiting 
trade, increasing the difficulty in achieving a food secure Indonesia.
The Significance of Food Trade in Indonesia
Globally, international trade in food and agriculture has more than doubled in real terms since 
1995 to be worth USD 1.5 trillion in 2018 (FAO, 2020). Indonesia has also participated in the 
global food trade system as both an importer and exporter. In 2018, imports supplied 100% 
of Indonesia’s wheat stock, 93.7% of garlic, 72.5% of soybeans, 69.9% of sugar, and 28.4% of 
beef (World Food Programme, 2020). Even for rice, a staple food for much of the population, 
Indonesia has been a net importer for the past decades (Patunru, forthcoming). Imported food 
both supplements and complements Indonesia’s own food production to fulfil the food demand 
of its 270 million population, as well as to provide variety and choice. Imported agricultural 
products, such as wheat, sugar and dairy ingredients, also provide important inputs to Indonesia’s 
important food processing sector. In total, food imports in 2018 were worth USD 20 billion (World 
Integrated Trade Solutions, 2020).
Meanwhile, Indonesian exports of food and agriculture products in 2018 were even greater than 
imports, at a total of USD 37 billion or 21% of Indonesia’s total exports (World Integrated Trade 
Solutions, 2020). Indonesia exports agricultural products in which it has comparative advantage—
not only palm oil, but also coffee, nuts, spices, and processed food products like cocoa butter and 
cocoa powder, and processed fruits and nuts. These exports contribute valuable revenue to the 
Indonesian economy.
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Trade is a Necessary Component for Food Security and 
Economic Development
Greater food trade has the potential to improve Indonesia’s poor food security and economic 
development. Food security is not about the rate of self-sufficiency, but about factors such as 
food affordability, nutritional value and dietary diversity. The World Food Summit in 1996 defined 
food security as existing “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2006). Singapore, which is 
almost wholly dependent on imports of agricultural products, ranks 19th in food 
security out of 113 countries according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global 
Food Security Index (2021). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s food security in the same 
index is ranked 65th—far below Malaysia (43rd), and lower than Thailand (51st), and 
Vietnam (63rd)—due to poor affordability and lack of dietary diversity. According 
to 2018 figures from the Indonesian Ministry of Health, 22 million Indonesians 
were enduring hunger and almost nine million Indonesian children under five 
years old were suffering from undernutrition, exhibiting stunting, wasting, and/
or being underweight (30.8%, 10.2%, and 17.7% of children respectively) (Asian 
Development Bank, 2019; Ministry of Health, 2018). 
Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, more people have fallen into poverty and 
have had to endure hunger due to unemployment and economic downturn. By September 2020, 
an additional 2.76 million Indonesians had fallen into poverty compared to the previous year, 
totalling to 27.5 million Indonesians living in poverty (Statistics Indonesia, 2021a). The World 
Bank’s survey on 4,000 households found that in November 2020, 23% of households reported 
experiencing food shortages, and 29% of households reported eating less (World Bank, 2021). 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) argues that food trade can lead 
to more stable food security by increasing the quantity and variety of food available, reducing 
food prices, encouraging a more balanced diet, and mitigating risk of shortages when there are 
disruptions to local production (Gadhok, 2016). This argument has been tested by two large-scale 
studies with different methods—D’Odorico et al.’s (2014) study on a set of 153 countries between 
1986 and 2010 and Dithmer & Abdulai’s (2017) study across 151 countries between 1980 and 
2007. Both studies concluded that countries with more open food trade are more likely to have 
better food security. 
In addition to food security, global food and agricultural trade can also increase Indonesia’s 
participation in global value chains (GVC) in which production processes of food products are 
spread into various stages in different countries to achieve efficiency gains. Participation in GVCs 
is associated with economic growth, better jobs, and reduced poverty (World Bank Group, 2020). 
GVC participation can be in the form of forward-linkages, in which raw agricultural materials are 
supplied to other countries to process, or in the form of more advanced backward-linkages, such 
as manufacturing and processing through the food and beverage industry. Backward-linkage 
participation in GVCs is shown to bring greater benefits through the domestic value-adding 
activities, yet Indonesia’s participation has been mostly in the form of forward-linkages (Asian 
Development Bank & Islamic Development Bank, 2019). Both types of linkages have generally 
declined from 2007 to 2017. Over the same time period, Indonesia’s food, beverages, and tobacco 
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manufacturing industries showed increased competitiveness as measured by New Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (NRCA) index (ADB & ISDB, 2019, p. 54). This indicates there is huge 
potential for Indonesia to maximize its comparative advantage by strengthening its food and 
beverage industry in GVCs to compete globally and grow its economy.
Major Policy Shift Must be Followed Through to Reform 
Complex Food Trade Policy
Despite its significance for food security and economic development, food trade has been heavily 
restricted in Indonesia by the country’s past self-sufficiency ambitions. Law No. 18/2012 on 
Food (Food Law) mandated that food and agricultural imports are allowed only when domestic 
supply is deemed insufficient, despite notoriously unreliable agriculture data. Import control is 
practically enforced through tariffs and NTMs such as quantitative restrictions or quotas that 
specify the amount of food allowed to be imported or monopoly rights for state-owned enterprise 
to import certain commodities like rice, maize, and white crystal sugar. Previous studies on 
beef (Respatiadi & Nabila, 2017a), sugar (Saputri & Respatiadi, 2018), and rice (Octania & Biru, 
2019; Respatiadi & Nabila, 2017b) show how import restrictions correlate with higher prices for 
Indonesian consumers.
In November 2020 the Indonesian House of Representatives passed the Omnibus Law No. 11/2020 
on Job Creation (Omnibus Law). In a major policy shift, the Omnibus Law revises the provisions in 
the Food Law that discouraged food import to now allow food import as a source of food supply 
(Table 1), and therefore contribute to food security. With this policy reform, food imports have 
equal legal standing with food from domestic production. This is a positive departure from the 
harmful protectionist aspects of Indonesia’s food policy to a policy that can potentially boost 





Changes in the Omnibus Law on Job Creation relating to food import
Food Law Omnibus Law
Article 1(7) Food availability is the condition 
of the availability of food from 
domestic production and National 
Food Reserve as well as import if 
the two main sources cannot 
meet demand
Food availability is the condition of 
the availability of food from 
domestic production, National Food 
Reserve, and food imports
Article 14(1) The source of food availability 
comes from domestic food 
production and National Food 
Reserve
The source of food availability is 
prioritized from:
a. Domestic food production
b. National Food Reserve; and/or
c. Food imports
Article 14(2)
Article 36(1) Food imports can only be 
conducted if domestic food 
production is not enough and/or 




Source: CIPS (2020) 
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While on the surface this change in the Law signifies liberalization of Indonesia’s food trade, 
the effect of the change will depend on the implementation and how far Indonesia can reform 
its complex food trade policy. The changes in the Omnibus Law will be further elaborated in 
implementing regulations. In the meantime, existing Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Trade 
regulations on food imports will remain in force until revoked. These regulations can undermine 
the food trade reform intended by the Omnibus Law, as the NTMs within the current regulations 
significantly restrict imports or make them more costly.
To maximize the food security and economic gains that Indonesia can 
achieve from its recent food trade liberalization policy, existing NTMs and 
their impacts must be critically examined. Further, as Article 14(2) indicates 
that tariffs and NTMs will still be used in the interest of farmers, fishermen, 
and micro- and small- food businesses, it is worth considering the balance 
between NTMs that set necessary standards for public health and safety 
versus those that are mostly protectionist by nature and harm consumers 
and producers that rely on imported materials.
All countries that participate in trade apply NTMs to help facilitate and 
regulate trade. NTMs are requirements that exported products must 
meet before they can be accepted by an importing country. For food and 
agricultural products, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) are the dominant categories. SPS measures are quarantine and biosecurity measures 
which are applied to protect human, animal or plant life or health. TBTs are technical regulations 
and standards, including for food packaging and labelling, animal welfare and agriculture 
and veterinary chemical use. Other NTMs include quantitative quotas, licensing, pre-shipment 
regulation, labelling requirements, export-related requirements, price control measures and 
anti-competitive measures.
These instruments are categorized in an international classification as chapters according to 
their scope and/or design (See Table 2). This classification was developed and agreed by several 
international organizations as part of a multi-agency initiative on NTMs led by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS)
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities (PSI)
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
In some cases, an NTM may be unfair or act as an overly costly barrier to trade. The WTO 
provides guidelines that state NTMs must be transparent, not overly restrictive to trade and not 
arbitrarily applied. These rules help distinguish legitimate policy regulations and procedures 
from protectionist measures that may impede trade. As such, various types of NTMs and their 
potential effects on Indonesian food security must be explored.
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INDONESIA’S USE OF NTMS 
In the Asia-Pacific region, applied tariffs have halved in the past two decades, but NTMs have 
increased by more than four times (United Nations, 2019, p. 4). Indonesia also follows the same 
trend as it has been reducing tariffs through various free trade agreements while significantly 
increasing its use of NTMs. Yet, NTMs often become barriers used as protectionist tools that can 
have a bigger influence on trade than tariffs (Cadot, Malouche, & Saez, 2012; UNCTAD, 2013; 
UNCTAD & The World Bank, 2018). An NTM tends to be less transparent than a tariff since it is not 
just a number, but rather information that is contained in various legal and regulatory documents, 
which makes its effect harder to assess or quantify. Hence, careful analysis is needed to dissect 
how NTMs affect trade, especially in food and agriculture. 
Just between 2015 and 2018, the number of regulations containing NTMs in Indonesia increased 
by almost 14%, from 169 in 2015 to 192 in 2018. It is important to note that one regulation 
can contain multiple NTMs and each NTM can cover many individual products. Under these 
regulations, the number of coded NTMs (that is, according to pre-defined NTM classifications) 
also increased significantly by 27%, from 767 in 2015 to 977 in 2018 covering 7,759 tariff lines 
or 77.5% of total tariff lines. These NTMs originated from 13 issuing government agencies, with 
the Ministry of Trade responsible for contributing the most (28.6%), followed by the Ministry of 
Industry (27.4%) and Ministry of Agriculture (19.9%). The Ministry of Agriculture, in particular, 
has been the most active in introducing new NTMs in recent years, increasing measures under 
their responsibility by 47%, from 132 in 2015 to 194 in 2018 (Munadi, 2019, pp. 72–73).
Indonesia uses NTMs more extensively in comparison to other countries, 
creating significant trade barriers. According to the Trade Barrier Index 2019 
that measures countries’ use of trade barriers, Indonesia ranks 72nd out of 86 
countries worldwide and 8th out of 14 countries regionally, partly due to the 
prevalence of NTMs applied to all partners and/or bilaterally. For the use of NTMs 
specifically, Indonesia ranks 70th with a score of 2.12 (out of 10 with higher score 
indicating a more extensive use of NTMs) which is higher than the global median 
(1.87) and peer countries like Singapore (1.67), Malaysia (1.69), and Vietnam 
(2.09) (Thompson & Montanari, 2019, p. 17).1 These findings were confirmed by 
Global Economic Openness Index that shows from 2009 to 2019, Indonesia’s ranking based on 
the prevalence of non-tariff barriers, a subset of NTM that carries a negative impact on trade, 
dropped from 34th to 80th out of 141 countries which means the non-tariff barriers are resulting 
in significant market distortion (Brien & Herring, 2019, p. 87).2
1 Scoring is calculated based on NTMs identified in the UNCTAD-TRAINS database.
2 Scoring is based on responses to the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion survey question “In your country, to what extent 
do non-tariff barriers (e.g. health and product standards, technical and labelling requirements, etc.) limit the ability of imported 
goods to compete in the domestic market?”
Indonesia uses NTMs 
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The increasing use of restrictive NTMs in Indonesia continues to contradict its international stance 
as an obligated member of various international trade organizations, in particular ASEAN, APEC, 
and WTO. As a member of ASEAN and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Indonesia has made 
a commitment to work on the “eventual elimination of unnecessary and unjustifiable non-tariff 
measures”, particularly in agriculture (ASEAN, 2019). Indonesia has also agreed to the ASEAN 
Guidelines for the Implementation of ASEAN Commitments on Non-Tariff Measures on Goods. 
They outline principles and best practices in the process of setting up NTMs, including 
• a regulatory review process through Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) or similar 
methods (Box 1), 
• providing opportunity for consultancy and engagement, 
• ensuring transparency, non-discrimination, and impartiality, and 
• conducting periodic review (AFTA Council, 2018). 
These processes can improve regulatory quality, but Indonesia has yet to have a formal 
mechanism and procedures. As a result, many of Indonesia’s policies including on food and food 
products are unclear, inconsistent, confusing and enforced in a haphazard manner (USDA, 2021; 
Wardhani, 2020). 
As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Indonesia must also follow the initial General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequent WTO rules that were established to reduce 
or eliminate trade barriers. Yet, Indonesia’s NTMs often infringe on these commitments. As of 
November 2019, there have been 15 dispute cases lodged against Indonesia in the WTO, seven 
of which relate to measures on animal, vegetable, and food products3 (World Trade Organization, 
2019). These dispute cases indicate that the trade barriers in the agro-food sector are perceived 
by Indonesia’s trading partners as violations of the global trade rules.
3 In the UNCTAD NTM databases, animal refers to any minimally processed commodity originating from animal sources, including 
fisheries; vegetable refers to any plant product, including forestry products; and food products are processed food products.
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Box 1. 
Regulatory Impact Assessment for NTMs
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) refers to the process of systematic assessment 
of proposed and existing regulations. RIA helps inform policymakers of the 
advantages and disadvantages of a proposed or existing policy, its potential impact 
to individuals, businesses, community, and the broader economy, as well as possible 
policy alternatives. Regulatory Impact Assessment can be conducted ex-ante during 
policy formulation, or ex-post to evaluate the implementation of the policy.
Many developing and developed countries have integrated the RIA process in 
their policymaking. Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia, for example, require 
policymakers to conduct an assessment and produce a Regulatory Impact Statement 
(RIS) before submitting a regulatory proposal (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.; The 
Treasury, Government of New Zealand, 2015; OECD, 2015a). The RIS must include the 
problem statement, assessment on the needs for government intervention, policy 
options, consulted stakeholders, cost and benefit, alternatives and implementation 
plan. This is considered an important element to make sure the proposed policies do 
not lead to obstacles for businesses.
In 2011, the Indonesian Ministry of Trade planned to establish a review process and 
a new unit (Non-Tariff Policy Team) within the Ministry to conduct RIAs on NTMs, 
coordinate with relevant agencies for the formulation and implementation of 
NTMs, and monitor and evaluate the implementation of the NTMs. The Ministry also 
introduced standard operating procedures (SOP) for how the team would conduct the 
independent and objective review (Cadot, Malouche, & Sáez, 2012). However, the plan 
fell through. There is yet to be a dedicated institution in Indonesia that regularly or 
systematically carries out regulatory reviews of NTMs (Munadi, 2019). 
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Indonesian NTMs on Food and Agriculture
Animal, vegetable, and food products are commodities with the most NTMs, contributing the 
largest share (22%) of all Indonesian NTMs (Brien & Herring, 2019, p. 32s). As of January 2021, 
there were 466 coded NTMs on these products administered by eight different 
ministries and agencies. According to the World Bank, the NTM frequency 
ratio or the percentage of products in that group subject to at least one NTM 
is 100% for animal products, 91.77% for vegetable products, and 99% for 
food products. Meanwhile, coverage ratio, or share of total imports covered 
by NTMs, is 100% or total coverage for animal products, 99.27% for vegetable 
products, and 98.82% for food products (WITS, 2019). Animal, vegetable, and 
food products are more regulated than other product groups (See Figure 1).
Figure 1.
NTM frequency and coverage ratio by sector, 2018










NTM frequency ratio NTM coverage ratio
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) https://wits.worldbank.org/ 
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Indonesian NTMs on food and agricultural products consist of technical measures (74%) and 
non-technical measures (26%). Their different effect on trade and price will be explained further.
Table 3.





























235 85 23 31 97 76 466
Note: UNCTAD-TRAINS data as of 7 January 2021 (2021) https://trains.unctad.org/ 
Technical NTMs
In terms of number of measures, most of the NTMs in the animal, vegetable, and food product 
groups are technical measures. SPS measures related to animal and plant health are the most 
common measure (50%). The larger number of SPS measures indicate a greater concern for 
quality and safety of products. Munadi (2019) observed that as a country’s income rises, the 
preference for quality products also rises, which may explain the large increase of SPS measures 
compared to other types of NTMs.
TBT measures such as importer registration, labelling, product certification, and inspection 
requirements other than lab testing for hygiene are the second most common (18%). Pre-
shipment inspections (PSI) where products must be certified at the port of origin are also 
commonplace, including for horticulture and raw sugar. In addition to PSI in loading ports, 
when arriving in Indonesia, imported food and agriculture products can only go through a select 
few ports due to limited availability of quarantine and inspection facilities. For example, onion 
and garlic imports can only come through Belawan Seaport, Medan; Tanjung Perak Seaport, 
Surabaya; Soekarno-Hatta Seaport, Makassar; and Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta; and free 
trade zones, as regulated in the Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 16/2012, while fruits and 
vegetables can come through those ports plus Tanjung Priok Seaport, Jakarta as regulated in 
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 42/2012. During busy seasons, the limited ports of entry 
for food commodities can be congested which results in extra costs and delays. This creates high 
inefficiency in the import process. 
The technical NTMs are in place with the intention to protect consumers and the environment 
by ensuring health and safety. Nevertheless, their excessive use can have the consequences 
of affecting the market structure and imposing burdensome costs to businesses which can be 
passed on to consumers. 
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In an International Trade Centre survey of Indonesian companies’ perspectives of NTMs, 
importers reported that the technical NTMs often result in costly delays and procedural obstacles. 
Inefficiencies in the system and enforcement of the NTM are caused by the local infrastructure 
and the capacity of officials. The reported procedural obstacles on food and agriculture trade 
include numerous administrative windows4, multiple documents that are 
often redundant, high fees and charges for certification, arbitrary behaviour 
of officials, and even informal payments (International Trade Centre, 2016). 
These procedural obstacles accrue high compliance costs as well as costs 
associated with delays. Indonesia’s average dwelling time is estimated at 
around five days, which is longer than its neighbours Singapore (1.5 days) 
and Hong Kong (two days) and partly due to long customs clearance process 
and inspection procedures (Hassan, Gurning, & Handani, 2020). In many cases, 
the processes of checking import documentation and inspections take even 
longer, even weeks and months, exacerbated by port congestion during busy periods, which 
result in extra demurrage cost (International Trade Centre, 2016; European Commission, 2017). 
A fruit trader reported that the compliance costs plus the protocols related to cold storage could 
contribute an additional 6% cost on top of the total value (Marks, 2016).
Quantitative Restriction and Non-Automatic Import Licensing System
Another crucial NTM in the food and agricultural sector are quantitative restrictions (QR). While 
quantitative restrictions only account for 7% of Indonesia’s NTMs on animal, vegetable, and food 
products, they are considered to be major barriers to the food trade. Quantitative restrictions 
are a non SPS-related prohibition that set limits on the quantity of a commodity a country can 
import. They are non-technical restrictions and are usually decided based on the estimated 
gap between domestic supply (including stock) and demand. Once an import quota is set, it is 
divided among registered importers. In order to get a quota allocation, importers must apply 
for a recommendation letter from the Ministry of Agriculture (or the Ministry of Industry for raw 
material import for industrial use) and an import license (Surat Persetujuan Impor or SPI) from 
the Ministry of Trade (Figure 2). 
4 Administrative windows refer to the various platforms and websites managed by different agencies that companies must go 
through to submit administrative documents for export import.
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For some staple commodities, the import quota is reserved for state-owned enterprises. For 
medium-quality rice (stipulated in Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs Regulation No. 
05/2018) and maize for feed and consumption5 (stipulated in Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 
21/2018), which are two of Indonesia’s staple commodities, the import monopoly lies with 
Indonesia’s state-owned logistics company, Bulog. For white crystal sugar, imports are reserved 
only for state-owned enterprises, as stipulated in Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 14/2020. 
These state-owned enterprises do not have the flexibility to import anytime. They can only import 
a certain amount based on a decision made in a national coordination meeting (Rapat Koordinasi 
Terbatas or Rakortas) between the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of 
Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and the related state-
owned enterprise itself.
Import decisions are made under the authority of the Ministry of Trade when domestic stocks are 
low based on available production and stock data. Political considerations affect the decisions 
when the import quota gets published. This also prevents importers from being responsive to 
international market prices and taking advantage of low global food price or bargains (Marks, 
2015). 
5 Maize for industrial raw material can be imported by food and beverage producers. 
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Figure 2.
Import process for private sector
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Some commodities will have additional requirements on top of the general import process. 
To obtain the recommendation from the Ministry of Agriculture to import garlic and onions, 
importers must prove their commitments to plant 5% of the total volume of import in Indonesia. 
The Ministry of Agriculture verifies their track record of fulfilling this requirement before issuing 
the recommendation (Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 39/2019 on Import Recommendation 
for Horticulture Product). Feeder cattle importers must import breeder cattle, as much as 5% of 
the imported feeder cattle (Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 41/2019 on Import of Ruminant 
Livestock to Indonesia). 
The additional measures required alongside the import license system are intended to boost 
domestic production towards Indonesia’s self-sufficiency goals. However, in practice, these 
recommendations are hard to implement. Importers who are not skilled at growing garlic find it 
difficult to find appropriate locations to grow garlic or maintain garlic farms. Meanwhile, feedlots 
have limited capacity to accommodate more breeder cattle. Breeder cattle need to be kept much 
longer than feeder cattle (years rather than months), taking up valuable space and resources 
and affecting business viability. Partnering with local farmers also brings its own complexities. 
As a result, both the garlic and the cattle programs have not reached their expected targets. The 
Ministry of Agriculture reported that only 30% of the expected mandatory garlic farm area has 
been achieved, while only 13.6% of the breeder import requirements have been fulfilled (Laoli, 
2018; Nasution, 2021). 
In March 2021, the Ministry of Trade announced the decision to allow an import of 1 million 
tonnes of rice during harvest season, which was immediately met with strong backlash from 
the media and the public. Indonesian President Joko Widodo then renounced the decision and 
ordered there will be no import until at least June 2021 (President of the Republic of Indonesia 
Bureau of Press, Media, and Information, 2021). Quantitative restrictions are usually placed 
to “protect” the domestic producers from global competition. Such protection undermines the 
opportunity for structural change and productivity improvement as it may remove the motivation 
and urgency to do so. In reality, quantitative restrictions create a tall trade barrier to affordable 
and often better-quality goods from the international market. It creates artificial scarcity because 
supply is restricted, resulting in higher prices and losses for the Indonesian consumers (Cheok 
& Kuriyama, 2017). 
Quantitative restrictions are associated with import delays due to the complicated process, which 
results in shortages in the market, and skyrocketing prices. In early 2020, Indonesian Commission 
for Supervision of Business Competition’s investigation (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha or 
KPPU) found that delays in issuing garlic import permits caused garlic prices to shoot up 49% in 
retail markets (KPPU, 2020). KPPU attributed delays to the process of verifying the mandatory 
planting requirement before issuing the import recommendation and SPI, and recommended 
changing the process to issue SPI first and to verify the mandatory planting area afterwards.
The non-automatic import licensing process does not only cause delays, but it has also led to 
corruption. Policymakers were found guilty of receiving bribes in exchange for granting import 
licenses (Neilson, 2018). The market distortion and welfare loss from quantitative restrictions 
may actually be greater than the benefits for Indonesian producers.
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Box 2. 
Automatic vs Non-Automatic Import Licensing System
According to WTO rules, import licensing system can be either automatic or non-
automatic. In an automatic import licensing system, an import license application is 
granted within ten working days in all cases. The system is administered neutrally 
and must not have any discriminatory effect on those applying for the license. Any 
person or firm that fulfils the legal requirements can equally apply for and obtain 
import licenses. 
In contrast, non-automatic import licensing system is used to administer quantitative 
restriction. WTO and ASEAN rules state that non-automatic import licensing system 
must also be administered in a neutral, fair, equitable, transparent, and predictable 
manner. There are provisions that applications must be processed in a first-come-
first-serve basis within 30 days, or simultaneously within 60 days. However, in 
reality, Indonesia’s non-automatic import licensing system has been criticized for 
being non-transparent and unpredictable, as evident by the WTO trade disputes.
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QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF NTMS  
NTMs on the food trade impose additional cost to the import of food items and affect their market 
prices. For commodities with significant import volumes such as sugar and beef, the NTMs add 
compliance costs to the food price, due to the additional requirements and procedural obstacles 
such as for licensing, packaging, quarantine, and labelling. Direct administrative costs may not 
be significant and they are often fixed. For example, PSI is estimated to be 0.35% of the border 
price, while quarantine is estimated to be 1.5% of the shipment value (Marks, 2017). However, 
costs for delays and additional logistics can swell up. 
For commodities with significant import volumes such as sugar 
and beef, the NTMs add compliance costs to the food price, due 
to the additional requirements and procedural obstacles such 
as for licensing, packaging, quarantine, and labelling. 
NTMs also reduce trade volumes. This is most obvious in quantitative restrictions, but other NTMs 
may affect the trade structure and can also reduce trade. Because of this supply restriction, 
Indonesia’s access is limited to more expensive domestic produce, causing an indirect cost borne 
by consumers.
Quantifying these costs is technically challenging due to the complexity of the measures and the 
data availability, especially since the application of the measures may differ across commodities. 
Previous studies may offer some cost estimates. 
Kee et al. (2008) estimated the percentage (ad valorem) tax equivalents of NTMs on a product 
level. This is convenient as it allows policymakers to consider an NTM as a tax. Indonesian NTMs 
on agriculture and food (HS chapters 1-24) were equivalent to a 49% tax on a simple average 
basis in 2008. Rice, meat and dairy faced average NTM tax-equivalents greater than 50%, while 
fruit, vegetables and other cereals still faced average NTMs equivalent to a tax of higher than 
40%. Since these estimates were produced in 2008, the number of NTMs and the number of 
products affected have only increased, as shown below (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.
Indonesia’s food and agriculture products affected by 
NTMs have been rising over recent years 







Source: UNCTAD-TRAINS database https://trains.unctad.org/ 
Note: graph starts at 2011, reflecting data availability. Graph shows data at the HS6 level for HS chapters 1-24, 
which cover agriculture and food.
Kee et al.’s estimates were not exporter-specific, which means that they are not bilateral and 
do not relate to exports from specific countries. Instead, they are measured just for Indonesia 
as an individual importer. It would be challenging to quantify the effects of NTMs on a combined 
exporter-specific, importer-specific and commodity-specific level for a given year (Fell, 2020). 
A more specific analysis remains a challenge because it relates to multiple events occurring 
at the same single point in time, and involves isolating the effects of each individual event on 
prices. Specifically, Indonesia’s NTMs affect prices for an individual commodity, but at the same 
time, Indonesia’s consumer incomes and consumer preferences are also affecting prices. On an 
individual commodity level, there is insufficient information to be able to isolate the effects of the 
NTMs. This problem challenges the accuracy of any bilateral commodity-level estimates of NTMs 
on prices at a single point in time.
Despite these challenges, the general influence of NTMs on prices is evident. The extensive 
imposition of pseudo-taxes on consumers results in high prices of agriculture and food goods 
landed in Indonesia. Figure 4 shows how much higher the unit value of agricultural and food 
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Source: UN Comtrade (2020)
The significant burden placed on Indonesian consumers is confirmed by OECD 
(2020). The OECD’s Consumer Support Estimate measures the total value 
of transfers from producers and taxpayers to consumers. For Indonesia the 
estimate is negative, meaning that taxpayers and producers are effectively taking 
money away from consumers. In 2019, the transfers away from consumers were 
estimated at IDR 309 trillion. This included IDR 340 trillion transferred from 
consumers to producers, which was just partially offset by taxpayer transfers of 
IDR 31 trillion to consumers.
Another way of quantifying the impact of NTMs is by calculating the rate of 
protection it provides to domestic industries. A study by Marks (2017) estimated 
the nominal rate of protection (NRP), which indicates the percentage by which 
restrictive policies raise domestic prices relative to border prices. The study 
found that the nominal rates of protection for food crops in Indonesia was 27.7%. Marks also 
estimated effective rates of protection (ERP) which indicate the percentage by which value added 
per unit of output is increased by trade interventions relative to free trade scenario. Where NRP 
measures the protection given to the final product, ERP measures the protection given to the 
inputs as well. A positive ERP indicates that the price of a sector’s output is raised by more than 
the prices of its intermediate inputs and this is due to trade interventions. A positive ERP gives 
a local processor or manufacturer a price advantage in the domestic market through protection 
from global competition, which can be to the disadvantage of consumers who have to pay the 
price. Indonesia’s trade restrictions on food crops amounted to an ERP of 64.3%. Among the 
For Indonesia the 
estimate is negative, 
meaning that taxpayers 
and producers are 
effectively taking money 
away from consumers. In 
2019, the transfers away 
from consumers were 
estimated at IDR 309 
trillion. 
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different commodities, rice, sugar, meat, and fruits have higher levels of protection from the 
trade restrictions (Table 4). 
The biggest contributor to the rates of protection are the quantitative restrictions. If the quantitative 
restrictions are excluded, the rest of the NTMs would amount to a much lower nominal rate of 
protection of 6.5% or effective rates of protection of 15.9%. The effect of quantitative restrictions 
is quite substantial in rice and meat which are subject to more stringent quantitative restrictions 
compared to fruits. Marks further estimated how much these rates of protection translate to 
an increase in cost of living and found that, when accounting for all NTM trade policies across 
all commodities in effect, the cost of living is 7.8% higher than in a free trade scenario. Marks 
identified rice as the greatest contributor to this increase.
The effect of quantitative restrictions is quite substantial in 
rice and meat which are subject to more stringent quantitative 
restrictions compared to fruits. 
Table 4.


































Source: Marks (2017). ERPc refers to ERP calculated using the Corden (1966) methods
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THE EFFECTS OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ON FOOD SECURITY  
The prevalence of NTMs in the agro-food sector has huge implications for food security in 
Indonesia, affecting price, quantity, and quality of the food being consumed. Indonesia’s domestic 
agricultural sector has been unable to produce the quantity, and often the 
quality of food to meet the increasing demand of the growing population. 
The Indonesian agriculture sector suffers from low productivity, reduced 
agricultural land due to land conversion and urbanisation, lack of necessary 
infrastructure, and climate change-related environmental risks, among 
many other factors, that in combination significantly inhibit the sector’s 
ability to produce efficiently (Asian Development Bank, 2019). As a response, 
food import plays an important role in ensuring availability, accessibility, 
affordability, and quality of food. 
Despite Indonesia’s ambition for self-sufficiency under the previous Food 
Law, it still needed to import key food commodities, including rice, soybeans, 
and sugar to supplement the huge deficit in agricultural production. Indonesia also imports other 
everyday food items such as garlic and beef, for which it can only produce a small percentage 
of the national demand. Yet, with the prevalence of NTMs covering these products, the trade of 
these important food commodities is often stifled. For example, the complex centralized buying 
process through Bulog relies on a national coordination meeting, which often delays decisions, 
leads to shortages and price spikes (Octania, 2021; Respatiadi & Nabila, 2017).
Quantitative restrictions prevent prices from coming down to international levels by restricting 
the number of imports allowed. Because of the restriction, Indonesian consumers can only access 
local supply that is more expensive than international products due to on-farm challenges, such 
as the high input cost, low productivity and yield, and a long distribution chain. The production 
cost of rice in Indonesia is three times higher than the production cost of rice in Vietnam (IFPRI). 
The import restrictions limit Indonesia’s access to cheaper international rice, and has led to 
the growing divergence between Indonesia’s domestic rice price and the international rice price 
(Figure 5).
The prevalence of NTMs 
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Source: Statistics Indonesia and Bank of Thailand
Note: The domestic price series is represented by the wholesale prices of IR-64 rice variety and the world price series is 
represented by the wholesale prices of Thai 25% broken rice variety. It is converted into Indonesian rupiah, adding a $20/ton 
shipping and handling cost, $5/ton import profit and the ongoing, specific tariffs (Rp 430/kg from January to December 2006, Rp 
550/kg from January to November 2007, and Rp 450/kg from December 2007 onward).
Quantitative restrictions are commonly believed to be necessary to protect farmers. With high 
production costs, Indonesian farmers cannot compete with Vietnam or Thailand and may lose 
if quantitative restrictions are removed. Examining this hypothesis further, Greenville (2018) 
found that integrating the Indonesian rice market into the global market by removing NTMs will 
only reduce Indonesia’s rice self-sufficiency from close to 100% to 90%. Hence, the argument of 
farmers’ loss is overestimated, and the small effect can be mitigated by efforts to retrain and 
reskill farmers. In fact, farmers are already affected by the high price of food, since two-thirds 
of them are net consumers who spend more on food than what they receive from their harvest. 
Yusuf and Warr (2018) found that protection in the food and agricultural sector has a larger price 
effect on household’s living cost than income effect on rural population that are dominated by 
farmers. 
In addition to supply restrictions, the high compliance costs of NTMs directly contribute to the high 
prices of imported food. The NTMs make the import process expensive, lessening the potential 
benefit that import could have and even undermining health improvements. Even after importing 
beef to fulfil the national demand, beef is still expensive in Indonesia, averaging at IDR 118,000 
in 2020 (PIHPS, 2021). That is equal to 10% of the average monthly expenditures of Indonesians6. 
Hence, very few Indonesians can afford to buy protein-rich beef. As a result, Indonesia has very




low meat consumption level, with only 2.2 kilograms of beef and veal per capita per year, lower 
than the world average of 6.4 kilograms per year (OECD, 2021). The World Food Programme 
(2017) found that vitamin B12, iron, and calcium are essential nutrients that mainly come from 
animal source foods which were too expensive and difficult to afford for Indonesian households.
NTMs undermine Indonesia’s chance of sourcing affordable food through imports, and hence 
threaten Indonesia’s food security in the availability, affordability, and utilization dimension. 
Limiting availability creates artificial scarcity, reduces affordability and consumer options. While 
insulation from international market may help Indonesia avoid food insecurity due to external 
shocks, it results in chronic food insecurity due to internal risks such as domestic economic and 
natural disasters (OECD, 2015b). Low-income consumers are particularly disadvantaged, as they 
spend a larger share of their income on food and are more vulnerable to price spikes.
While insulation from international market may help Indonesia 
avoid food insecurity due to external shocks, it results in chronic 
food insecurity due to internal risks such as domestic economic 
and natural disasters 
31
THE EFFECTS OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES 
IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
The costs of protectionist NTMs on food and agriculture are also borne by Indonesia’s food 
and beverage industry. This has an impact on the Indonesian economy because the food and 
beverage (F&B) manufacturing industry alone contributed 6.25% to the Indonesian GDP in 2018 
(Kementerian Perindustrian, 2019). It is the largest sector with a 39.5% share of the non-oil and gas 
manufacturing GDP in the second quarter of 2020 (Kementerian Perindustrian, 2020). It was also 
among the few sectors that still showed a 1.66% cumulative growth amid the Covid-19 pandemic 
in 2020 (Statistics Indonesia, 2021b). Even during the pandemic, it employed around 5 million 
Indonesians or 27.6% percent of the total manufacturing workforce in Indonesia (Kementerian 
Perindustrian, 2020). Hence, this industry is vital for Indonesia’s economic development. 
The F&B manufacturing industry is considerably integrated in global trade, both to source its 
raw material and to export its products. The industry contributes the highest export value among 
other manufacturing industries, reaching USD 13.7 billion in the first semester of 2020. This 
was a 10.2% increase from the same period of the previous year. It also imported raw materials 
valued at USD 5.6 billion in the same period (Kementerian Perindustrian, 2020).
The growing number of NTMs in Indonesia and its trading partners limit corporate access to the 
global market and may reduce their productivity and competitiveness. NTMs can affect firms 
and industries in two ways—by increasing the cost of inputs, or by imposing measures when 
exporting to other countries (Figure 6) (Ghodsi & Stehrer, 2016). They impose additional costs to 
businesses through enforcement costs, sourcing costs, and process-adaptation costs (Ing, Cadot, 






Foreign value added imported
Domestic value added
Source: Adapted from Franssen & Solleder (n.d.)  
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On the input side, the F&B industry still imports raw materials since domestic production of 
commodities is often insufficient in quantity and quality for processing. For example, wheat, a 
key ingredient for instant noodles, is almost 100% sourced from import because it cannot be 
optimally grown in Indonesia. Even though Indonesia is among the top five chocolate producers 
in the world, chocolate manufacturers in Indonesia also have to rely on imported cocoa beans 
due to the low quality of Indonesian cocoa beans (Kementerian Perdagangan, 2019).  
Despite the scarcity of raw materials for industrial use, firms must also go through a complicated 
import licensing process and wait for the release of the importation quota by the relevant 
ministries, including the Ministry of Industry. One case that exemplifies the complicated licensing 
requirement for industry is sugar. According to the Ministry of Industry Regulation No. 3/2021, 
imports of raw sugar are restricted through a quota system based on recommendations from the 
Ministry of Industry. It is reserved only for new sugar mills operating since 2010 and state-owned 
enterprises. There are only six new sugar mills out of 66 total mills that can utilize this facilitation 
provision, leaving the majority of the mills unable to access raw materials (USDA, 2019). 
Furthermore, new sugar mills must be integrated with sugar plantations in their possession 
or through partnership with local farmers. After years of this policy in place, Indonesia’s sugar 
production did not show any significant progress. Domestic sugar production is still not enough 
to fulfil the industry’s demand, only producing a total of 2.1 million tonnes per year while the 
industry uses 4 million tonnes per year (United States Department of Agriculture, 2020). The 
quantitative restrictions instead often delay sugar imports and cause significant constraints to 
the sugar industry. Firms, represented through the Indonesian Food and Beverage Association 
(Gabungan Pengusaha Makanan dan Minuman Seluruh Indonesia or GAPMMI), publicly expressed 
their frustrations in an official letter to the media, foreseeing sugar shortages due to import 
delays (Sandi, 2020). 
Many NTMs imposed on raw food and agriculture materials for industrial use, such as in the 
sugar case, are intended to foster backward linkages to the domestic economy, to prioritize 
domestic production, and to increase domestic value add. Yet, they are often ineffective. As 
Patunru and Rahardja (2015) argued, such a protectionist industrial policy is not effective in 
a world characterized by increasingly global value chains. Forced linkages may reallocate 
resources to few sectors at the expense of existing and potential industries. According to OECD 
(2013), protectionist policies on imports of intermediate products can act as taxes on exports. 
They increase commodity prices and make them less competitive globally.
The disadvantages of NTMs are more burdensome to smaller firms. The costs 
associated with the technical import process, such as PSIs, are fixed costs, 
meaning that additional costs will not change depending on the traded goods’ 
quantity or value (Ahn & Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, 2019). Bigger firms, which 
can afford to import in larger quantities, can accrue smaller additional costs 
per unit as the fixed costs are applied to larger import quantities. Smaller 
firms, however, can only spread the fixed costs over a smaller import quantity, 
therefore will accrue higher extra costs per unit. As a result, the prices of the 
end-product might be higher for smaller firms and make it less competitive 
in the market. 
Bigger firms, which can afford 
to import in larger quantities, 
can accrue smaller additional 
costs per unit as the fixed costs 
are applied to larger import 
quantities. Smaller firms, 
however, can only spread the 
fixed costs over a smaller 
import quantity, therefore will 
accrue higher extra costs per 
unit. 
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Empirical data on how NTMs affect firms and industries are mixed, but generally point to potential 
negative effects. Estimation by Wardani, Mulatsih, & Rindayati (2018) on RCEP countries found 
that NTMs do not have a significant effect on the export of Indonesia’s food industry, but they 
acknowledge their findings were different from previous studies and concluded by emphasizing 
the need to address NTMs in the RCEP agreement. A more recent study by Korwatanasakul & 
Baek (2020) contends NTMs have negative impacts on firms’ import of intermediate goods to be 
exported, also known as backward GVC participation, and that the effect is greater than that of 
tariffs.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Food and agriculture trade is an important component for food security and economic 
development. However, the proliferation of NTMs imposed on food and agricultural trade is costly 
and has contributed to the increasing gap between Indonesia’s high food prices and global food 
prices. This has negatively affected the poorest population and smaller firms in particular. 
The policy reform in the Omnibus Law has acknowledged the importance of liberalizing 
Indonesia’s food trade. Within this understanding, the Indonesian government, especially the 
Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Industry, should address NTMs 
in existing regulations in order to support the reform. Given the complexity of NTMs, three broad 
level recommendations may minimize the cost of NTMs:
• Conduct Regulatory Impact Assessment on NTMs as basis for reform
This study has shown that quantifying the cost of NTMs are difficult given their complex 
nature. The true cost of NTMs is often hidden behind the details and may even undermine 
the original intention of the government when legislating reforms in the Omnibus Law. The 
Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Industry should conduct 
a comprehensive review of existing NTMs through a Regulatory Impact Assessment 
framework (RIA). RIAs can help clarify the cost and benefits of specific NTMs. RIAs should 
be conducted in consultation with the private sector that has the information and that is 
most affected. The result of the RIAs should be used to streamline existing NTMs. If NTMs 
are found to have greater costs and few benefits, those NTMs should be removed. 
RIAs should also be conducted for existing and future NTMs. This step ensures government 
accountability on the design of their policies, and supports an improved regulatory process. 
Through RIAs, future NTMs can be designed with the least trade distortionary effects on 
quantities or price.
• Improve enforcement infrastructure and systems to minimize compliance cost
Technical NTMs like SPS are necessary to protect public health and the environment. In 
order to effectively implement these NTMs with the lowest cost possible, investments must 
be made to upgrade infrastructure, such as inspection capacities in ports and quarantine 
facilities. This applies not just to physical infrastructure, but also human resources that 
are involved in the process. This will reduce costly procedural delays. In addition, trade 
systems used for administrative purposes, such as the Indonesian National Single Window 
(INSW) and ASEAN Single Window (ASW) that connects national single windows in ASEAN 
countries, must be improved and streamlined in order to reduce red tape. Developing a 
system that connects all relevant windows will reduce the need to resubmit the same 
document multiple times, reduce room for discretion and potential abuse on different 
levels, and speed up the importing process.
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• Introduce automatic import licensing system in place of non-automatic licensing and 
quota system
QR and the non-automatic import licensing system have been identified as having large 
distortionary effects on trade, contributing the largest share to the rate of protection. The 
process has resulted in costly delays, shortages, and corruption cases, with negative 
effects on domestic producers including the domestic F&B manufacturing industry. The 
Ministry of Trade should reform its import licensing system and adopt a transparent 
automatic import licensing system. An automatic import licensing system will issue an 
import permit automatically as long as an importer fulfils technical requirements. 
An automatic import licensing system will result in a faster and more transparent import 
process. This will allow importers to compete fairly and Indonesian consumers to enjoy 
greater access to cheaper goods.
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